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WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO
DURING THE 1952 TERM
Fowler V. Harper t and Arnold Leibowitz I
CONTRADICTIONS FROM THE COURT
This is the fourth ' and last of a series of studies made in an
attempt to throw some light on the operation of the certiorari jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court. On the whole, this has been a baffling and
frustrating experience. One can get statistics by the simple process
of counting and classifying. But it is far more difficult to get the
information necessary to make meaningful the data on this phase of
the Court's behavior. It is next to impossible to find out much about
the several hundred cases which clog the Miscellaneous Dockets. Even
as to cases on the Appellate Docket, one would need the time of the
nine Justices and their staffs to have much confidence in his judgment.
Nor has the Court itself been of much help. Indeed, the confusion,
which these articles have emphasized if they have not removed, has,
if anything, been confounded by the views of the Justices as expressed
during the last term. Certainly the profession is no nearer an under-
standing of the effect of a denial of certiorari. Those of its members
who took Mr. Justice Frankfurter at his frequently expressed word
that a denial means only that fewer than four Justices vote to review,
now have the uncomfortable assurance that four members of the Court
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School; author of HARPER ON TORTS and other
books.
: Member of the Third Year Class, Yale Law School.
1. The previous studies are: Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court
-Did Not Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 293 (1950); Harper and
Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100
U. OF PA. L. REv. 354 (1951); Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 439 (1953).
(427)
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think that it may mean a great deal more. Those of us who thought
this all along find that four other members of the Court agree with
Justice Frankfurter.
This explosion of contradictions came in February in a series
of habeas corpus cases brought by state convicts under death sentences
for rape and murder.2 Only three months before, on the denial of a
rehearing on a petition for a writ of certiorari by Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg, Justice Frankfurter had stated his usual position: "Mis-
conception regarding the meaning of such a denial persists despite
repeated attempts at explanation. It means and all that it means is,
that there were not four members of the Court to whom the grounds
on which the decision of the Court of Appeals was challenged seemed
sufficiently important when judged by the standards governing the
issue of the discretionary writ of certiorari." ' But now Justice Frank-
furter finds that four of his brethren shared the "misconception," at
least so far as concerned habeas corpus cases.
It is true that petitions by state prisoners for the writ of habeas
corpus in federal courts present peculiar problems. One is whether
the exhaustion of state remedies requires a petition in the Supreme
Court for certiorari to the highest court of the state. While it is
true, as Mr. Justice Jackson points out,4 that it sounds silly to discuss
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
as a "state remedy," nevertheless Darr v. Burford5 imposes such a
requirement and, regardless of semantics, this seems to be accepted
by all the Justices.
The cases involved review of judgments of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, first argued in 1951, reargued in 1952 and
decided in 1953. In each case, petitions for certiorari in the Supreme
Court for direct review of the convictions in the state court had been
denied. On habeas corpus in each case, the federal district court, in
determining the propriety of granting the writ, considered the effect
of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on the same constitutional
questions. In so doing, the district judges had precedents both for
and against such consideration.6 To use Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
2. Brown v. Allen, Speller v. Allen, Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(hereinafter referred to as Brown v. Allen) ; United States ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
3. Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952).
4. "To say that our command to certify the case to us is a state remedy is to
indulge in a fiction, and the difficulty with fictions is that those they are most apt
to mislead are those who proclaim them." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542
(1953) (concurring opinion).
5. 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
6. Mr. Justice Reed cites the precedents in footnote 4 (p. 451) of his opinion
as follows: "The courts below have divided since the Darr case on the effect to be
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own words, "the Court of Appeals relied heavily on our denial
of certiorari in ruling against applications for federal habeas
corpus. . ." I.
accorded a denial of certiorari by this Court." He then lists the following cases
under the indicated headings:
No SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT DISCRETIONARY EFFECT
Goodman v. Lainson, 182 F.2d 814 Anderson v. Eidson, 191 F.2d 989
(1st Cir. 1951); (8th Cir. 1951);
McCarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 Holland v. Eidson, 90 F. Supp. 314
(1st Cir. 1951); (W.D. Mo. 1950);
Soulia v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 233 (1st Pennsylvania ex rel. Gibbs v. Ashe,
Cir. 1951); 93 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Pa. 1950);
Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Soulia v. O'Brien, 94 F. Supp. 764
Cir. 1951) ; (D. Mass. 1950) ;
Ekberg v. McGee, 191 F.2d 625 (9th Goodwin v. Smyth, 181 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir. 1951) (also reported at 194 Cir. 1950);
F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1951)); Adkins v. Smyth, 188 F2d 452 (4th
Sampell v. California, 191 F.2d 721 Cir. 1951);
(9th Cir. 1951); Byars v. Swenson, 192 F.2d 739 (4th
Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 963 Cir. 1951);
(1st Cir. 1951) ; Frazier v. Ellis, 196 F.2d 231 (5th
Bacom v. Sullivan, 194 F.2d 166 Cir. 1952);
(5th Cir. 1952); Lyle v. Eidson, 197 F.2d 327 (8th
United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, Cir. 1952) ;
195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952); United States ex rel. Skinner v.
Hawk v. Hann, 103 F. Supp. 138 (D. Robinson, 105 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.
Neb. 1952) ; Ill. 1952).
Ex parte Wells, 99 F. Supp. 320
(N.D. Cal. 1951);
Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96
(9th Cir. 1952);
United States ex rel. Master v. Baldi,
198 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1952);
United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn,
198 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1952).
7. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489 (1953). To this statement the Justice
appended the following footnote:
"In No. 20, Daniels v. Allen, after speaking of the denial of certiorari the
District Judge felt it difficult to believe 'that any impartial person would conclude
in the light of the procedural history of this case that it clearly appears that peti-
tioners were denied the substance of a fair trial.' He concluded the petitioners had
had a fair trial, that the writ should be vacated 'because not available to petitioners
on the procedural history, and if so, the petitioners are not entitled to discharge'
since they did not substantiate their charges. Daniels v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 208,
213, 216. The Court of Appeals stated that it was only necessary to consider the
proposition that petitioners were not entitled to the writ in view of the procedural
history of the case and affirmed, saying that petitioners could not by habeas corpus
circumvent the results of their failure to comply with the State procedural rules.
Their allegation of peculiar hardship in only one day's default in complying with
State procedural rules was before the Supreme Court in their application for
certiorari 'and, proper respect for that Court requires that we assume that, if it
had thought that such enforcement of the rules of court amounted to a denial of
a fair hearing to men condemned to death, it would have granted certiorari either
to the Supreme Court [of the State] or the trial court and would have reviewed
the case. The case falls squarely, we think, within what was said by the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 ... ' Daniels v. Allen, 192 F.2d 763,
768, 769.
"In No. 22, Speller v. Allen, the District Court stated that it 'felt strongly
disposed to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus solely on the procedural
history' but decided to hear evidence on the merits. After hearing evidence, the
Court dismissed, 'upon the procedural history and the record in the State Courts,
for the reason that habeas corpus proceeding is not available to the petitioner
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In Brozwn v. Allen, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself and
Justices Black, Douglas, Burton and Clark, explained at length the
Court's difficulty in handling the many petitions for certiorari which
each year jam its docket. Special attention was given to habeas corpus
proceedings by state prisoners. Based on a study of the files of 126 8
such cases, he pointed out the unusual difficulty of determining the
issues, much less the merits thereof. "As shown there," he said,
"only 13 of 126 petitions were drawn by lawyers; others, of course,
may have been drawn by lawyers either in or out of prison who did
not choose to sign the petition. But our experience affirms the con-
clusion set forth in the survey based on one test of the legal adequacy
of the petitions, that in a large number of cases, the petitions must
be combed through to find the issues, certainly much more so than
is true of the ordinary petitions for certiorari." '
Justice Frankfurter further emphasized the inadequacy of the
records in many habeas corpus cases.
"The certified records we have in the run of certiorari cases
to assist understanding are almost unknown in this field. Indeed,
the number of cases in which most of the papers necessary to
prove what happened in the State proceedings are not filed is
striking. . . . [W]e almost never have a transcript of these
proceedings to assist us in determining whether the trial is ade-
quate. . . . [In less than one-fourth of the cases is more than
a perfunctory order of the State courts filed." 10
He then points out that the delicacy of the relations between
federal and state authority required some kind of a review by the
Supreme Court of the state proceedings before an application to a
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, but concluded that
to hold a denial of certiorari to the state court the equivalent of
approval of the decision would amount to a subversion of the Act of
for the purpose of raising the identical question passed upon in those Courts.'
Further, even if entitled to raise the same question, petitioner did not substantiate
his claims. Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92, 95, 97. The Court of Appeals cited
Ex parte Hawk and quoted from its opinion in Stonebreaker v. Snyth, 163 F.2d
498, 499, to the same effect as the language in No. 20, that 'proper respect' compels
the conclusion that the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari had it thought
petitioner's constitutional rights violated. Speller v. Allen, 192 F.2d 477, 478.
"In No. 32, Brown v. Allen, the District Court relied on Stonebreaker v. Smyth
and denied the writ, noting that petitioner had apparently had a fair and impartial
trial in the State courts and that the Supreme Court had refused to review the
State court action. Brown v. Crawford, 98 F. Supp. 866. The Court of Appeals
considered the case together with No. 22, and, as stated above, affirmed."
8. See Appendix to Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 514 (1953).
9. Brown v. Alien, 344 U.S. 443, 493 n.3 (1953).
10. Id. at 493-4.
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1867,11 which defined the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction in
habeas corpus. In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter said: 12
"The reasons why our denial of certiorari in the ordinary run
of cases can be any number of things other than a decision on the
merits are only multiplied by the circumstances of this class of
petitions. And so we conclude that in habeas corpus cases, as in
others, denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted as an 'expression
of opinion on the merits.'"
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring with the majority in affirming
the decisions below but with the minority on the meaning of cer-
tiorari, cut sharply into the fiction that the denial of certiorari is
meaningless:
"But now it is proposed to neutralize the artificiality of
the process and counterbalance the fiction that our certiorari is a
state remedy by holding that this step which the prisoner must
take means nothing to him or the state when it fails, as in most
cases it does.
"The Court is not quite of one mind on the subject. Some
say denial means nothing, others say it means nothing much.
Realistically, the first position is untenable and the second is
unintelligible. How can we say that the prisoner must present
his case to us and at the same time say that what we do with it
means nothing to anybody. We might conceivably take either
position but not, rationally, both, for the two will not only burden
our own docket and harass the state authorities but it makes a
prisoner's legitimate quest for federal justice an endurance contest.
"True, neither those outside of the Court, nor on many
occasions those inside of it, know just what reasons led six
Justices to withhold consent to a certiorari. But all know that a
majority, larger than can be mustered for a good many decisions,
has found reason for not reviewing the case here. Because no
one knows all that a denial means, does it mean that it means
nothing? Perhaps the profession could accept denial as meaning-
less before the custom was introduced of noting dissents from
them. Lawyers and lower judges will not readily believe that
Justices of this Court are taking the trouble to signal a meaning-
less division of opinion about a meaningless act. It is just one
of the facts of life that today every lower court does attach
importance to denials and to presence or absence of dissents from
denials, as judicial opinions and lawyers' arguments show." 13
11. 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
12. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953). The opinion of Justice Frank-
furter held that there was not only no basis for holding the denial of certiorari
res judicat, but equally no basis for leaving the district judge free to guess whether
the Court has passed on the merits. "The District Judge ordinarily knows painfully
little of the painfully little we know." Id. at 494.
13. Id. at 542.
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Justice Jackson finds some "order in the confusion" by the dis-
tinction between the effect of a denial of certiorari as stare decisis and
as res judicata.' 4  Of course, it has no significance as a precedent,
he argues, because it approves no principle entitled to weight in sub-
sequent cases. As res judicata, writing finis to a legal issue and,
perhaps, a human life, it has meaning as the Rosenbergs and countless
others could corroborate if they could testify from the grave. Justice
Jackson's position is at variance with the understanding and practice
of the profession as to the first point, 5 and with the law as applied
to habeas corpus proceedings as to the second."8
A series of articles on certiorari, therefore, starts out with two
strikes against it. First, there is the position of a majority of the
Court that certiorari is meaningless; " second, the Supreme Court
seldom says anything except "certiorari denied." Occasionally it ad-
monishes the legal world that that is all that is being said.-8  Reasons
are rarely given, 9 and if stated are delivered with cryptic brevity as
if to point up the secret. If this last is indeed its aim, it has apparently
succeeded. Judging by the figures since the advent of the wholesale
discretionary jurisdiction of the Court,"0 lawyers still do not understand
14. Id. at 543.
15. Lawyers constantly cite cases as precedents, adding "certiorari denied," with
the appropriate reference.
16. Justice Jackson himself recognized the difficulty involved in the principle of
res judicata as applied to habeas corpus proceedings.
17. Not only in the habeas corpus situation, supra, but as a general rule.
Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 403 (1931); Indianapolis v. Chase Na-
tional Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 75, 83 (1941).
This last case carries the view to an extreme. The district court originally
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The case was then heard on the merits, and then once again took the hard road
up to the Supreme Court. This time, the petition having been on the merits, the
Court granted certiorari. It then realigned the parties, as a result found no di-
versity, and dismissed the case. Seven years had gone by.
See Statements in other cases to the same effect, collected in ROBERTSON AND
KHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 603 n.3
(2d ed., Wolfson and Kurland, 1951).
18. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
19. During the 1951 term, reasons were given for denial of certiorari in four
cases: twice the reason was that application was not made within the time provided
by law; once, "for want of a final judgment;" and once because the judgment was
based on a nonfederal ground adequate to support it. See Harper and Pratt, What
the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. OF PA. L. REv. 439,
442 (1953).
During this past term reasons for the denial of certiorari were delivered
thirteen times. All cases were in forma pauperis. The reason given was al-
ways the same: the application was not made in time. This may be of some aid
to convicts in prison, though it is highly doubtful. To lawyers, to be reminded
that an application must be made in time can hardly be considered helpful.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-7 (Supp. 1949) (originally granted in 1925).
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the subtle handling of this technique of review. The number of cases
which bombard the Court has increased in recent years.21 The number
of certiorari petitions has increased also,2 retaining its dominance
over the Court's business; ' but the percentage of petitions granted
21. Cases filed in the Supreme Court:
1927 844 1940 977
1928 808 1941 1178
1929 791 1942 984
1930 893 1943 997
1931 883 1944 1237
1932 906 1945 1316
1933 1021 1946 1510
1934 926 1947 1295
1935 986 1948 1465
1936 941 1949 1270
1937 1004 1950 1181
1938 922 1951 1234
1939 981 1952 1437
Figures based upon articles on the annual business of the Supreme Court in H v.
L. REv. (1927-1938); DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES CouRT, ANN. REP. (1939-1951); 21 U.S.L. WEK 3325 (1952).
22. Certiorari petitions filed:
1927 587 1940 889 (120)
1928 649 1941 962 (178)
1929 692 1942 874 (147)
1930 726 1943 914 (214)
1931 738 1944 1142 (339)
1932 797 1945 1120 (393)
1933 880 1946 1259 (528)
1934 835 1947 1073 (426)
1935 865 1948 1134 (447)
1936 824 1949 1074 (441)
1937 873 1950 986 (404)
1938 806 1951 1025 (413)
1939 886 (117) 1952 1081 (441)
This quantitative increase is mainly the result of the increase in in
petitions placed in parentheses alongside the total figure.
23. Percentage of certiorari cases before the court:
1927 69% 1940 90%
1928 80% 1941 81%
1929 77% 1942 88%
1930 81% 1943 92%
1931 83% 1944 92%
1932 87% 1945 84%
1933 86% 1946 83%
1934 90% 1947 83%
1935 90% 1948 77%
1936 88% 1949 85%
1937 86% 1950 83%
1938 86% 1951 83%
1939 90% 1952 75%
The percentages in this and the following footnote are based upon:
For the years 1927-1938-Articles on the annual business of the
in HARv. L. REv. (1928-1940).
forma pauperx
Supreme Court
For the years 1939-1951-DIRECTOR OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES CoURTs, ANN. REP. table A 1 (1942-1952).
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has shown no similar increase.2" When this expansion of the cer-
tiorari jurisdiction is coupled with the discretionary method of handling
appeals -per curiam adjudication 26 on the merits either by a dis-
missal for insubstantiality 2" or affirmance or reversal-practically the
entire work of the Court is included.2" Thus, making known the
criteria of review is a matter of concern.
Nevertheless, the Court has thrown little light on the subject.
This has material consequences. A welter of cases means hurried
decisions. This is not solved by the denial of review in many cases,
in order that those cases that are decided can be decided more carefully.
Such a procedure presumes a careful selection of cases for decision.29
Time is needed to consider whether or not to review. Justice Frank-
furter has commented:
"If the Court is limited in the number of cases it can decide,
no less is it limited in the number it can decide not to decide." "
Such a mass of petitions with their accompanying
records and briefs gives rise to a feeling of oppression that is
peculiarly hostile to the serenity and leisure indispensable to the
best judicial work. Not only does it affect the 'mental climate'
24. Percentage of certiorari petitions granted review:
1927 14% 1940 22.7%
1928 15% 1941 19.4%
1929 19% 1942 21.1%
1930 21% 1943 18.8%
1931 18.5% 1944 21.5%
1932 18.5% 1945 21.5%
1933 16.8% 1946 20.2%
1934 20% 1947 14.9%
1935 17.2% 1948 21.6%
1936 18.6% 1949 13.3%
1937 17.7% 1950 15.2%
1938 16% 1951 15.4%
1939 22.3% 1952 16.3%
25. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 12.
26. For the similarity of this type of adjudication to certiorari and for the prob-
lems of the per curiam decision, see Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court
Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. OF PA. L. REv. 439, 446-51 (1953). On
the frequency of this method of decision, see id. at 450, and infra at Appendix Tables
II and III.
27. See Ulman and Spears, "Dismnissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Ques-
tion," 20 B.U.L. Rxv. 501 (1940); Note, The Insubstantial Federal Question, 62
HARV. L. REv. 488 (1949).
28. The only cases that would appear to escape this are the few that are within
the original jurisdiction of the Court. These constitute an infinitesimal part of the
Court's work each term. During the past three terms, the Court decided five cases
originating on the original docket. See Appendix Table III infra.
29. In NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 570-6 (1950), Frank-
furter, dissenting to the granting of certiorari, noted the consequences of granting
review to the wrong cases as the following: (1) Has a bad psychological effect on
the court of appeals; (2) Causes a waste of time which diverts the Court from other
matters; and (3) Encourages hundreds of petitions which do not belong before the
Court.
30. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1933, 48 HARv. L. REv. 238, 277 (1934).
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in which the Court moves. It is bound to affect its sureness of
judgment upon these certioraris. Considering the speed with
which petitions must be disposed of, increase in numbers increases
the margin of error. . . Plainly, the Court is operating under
a stringent policy. But the circumstances under which it is em-
ployed-the pressure of the Court's business-make extremely
difficult the application of the Court's avowed criteria.
The problem, then may be for the Court to crack down on the
number of petitions coming before it. This can only be done by
convincing a substantial number of losing attorneys that there is no
sense in "taking this case right up to the United States Supreme Court;"
but to make an attorney with a bothersome client admit this, the
position of the Court must be made clear indeed.
Frankfurter and Hart, writing in 1934 on the Supreme Court,
suggested that penalties for frivolous appeals be imposed; 12 but al-
though there are precedents 3 and statutory authority for this,3 it is
not now used. They also suggested the use of a system of substantial
costs, similar to that of the English, to discourage unmerited applica-
tions.3s But the value of this system depends in large measure on
the ability of the attorney to judge beforehand how meritorious the
case is.
Their other suggestion appears to be more valuable. It is for
the Court to give reasons for the grant of certiorari in the course of
writing its opinion. While this has in some measure been followed,"6
unfortunately the value of these statements has been diminished by
their vagueness. 7  However, it is not adequate even if it were fol-
31. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1928, 43 H.imv. L. REv. 33, 47 (1929).
Some idea of the pressure can be gained by the quotations and commentary in
STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUrREM CouRT PRACTICE 126-7 (1950).
32. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1933, 48 HAv. L. REv. 238, 244 (1934).
33. Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U.S. 188 (1929); Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith,
278 U.S. 191 (1929); Note, Penalties for Frivolous Appeals, 43 HARv. L. REV. 113
(1929).
34. Judicial Code §237(c), as appended in the Act of February 13, 1925. 28
U.S.C. §344(c) (1946).
35. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supremw Court at October Term,
1933, 48 HARv. L. Rlv. 238, 244 (1934).
36. In 1935, of 103 opinions, 52 gave the reason for the granting of certiorari;
in 1936, of 106 opinions, 49 gave the reason for the granting of the writ. Frank-
furter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1935
and 1936, 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 598 (1938). In 1948, of 97 cases decided by full
opinions, 58 gave reasons. Note, The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HAgv. L. REv.
119, 120 n.11 (1949). In 1949, 62 of 76 opinions gave reasons for granting cer-
tiorari. Note, The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 HAgv. L. REv. 158 (1950).
This past term, however, in only 35 of the 92 opinions were explicit reasons given.
37. For example out of the 58 cases in which reasons were stated, 22 of the
58 merely stated without elaborating that the case was "important." Note, The
Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HAzv. L. REv. 119, 120 n.11 (1949).
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lowed more fully. There are certain types of cases in which certiorari
should not be granted. These cannot be determined by an examination
of the reasons for granting the writ in proper cases. The hope that
breathes eternal in a losing client will require more than a negative
pregnant to stop his asking the Court for review. Further, the Court
may not always be justified in granting certiorari; at least in the
opinion of some Justices.38 There are numerous instances in which
certiorari has been dismissed as improvidently granted, 9 and even
in cases which were heard, Justice Frankfurter has sometimes stated
his dissent thereto. °
Professor Louis Jaffe, in dealing with the problem of getting
some certainty into this field, suggested three other alternatives: 41
(1) reintroducing appeals in certain areas; (2) "attempting the rather
futile task of further refinement of standards for the grant of the
writ;" and (3) requiring reasons for refusal when one or more of
the Justices dissent.
The first alternative begs the question to some extent, since if
the Court could agree on which areas, it might be equally easy to
follow a discernible pattern in granting certiorari. Furthermore, it
is not in point here, though this is no fault of Professor Jaffe, since
the adoption of the proposal would not result in the lightening of
the Court's burden unless a corresponding elimination of appeals in
certain areas is instituted. A determination of which areas leads to
Professor Jaffe's second alternative.
This alternative is dismissed in the process of stating it by calling
the idea "futile." The third is presented as the most feasible. It is
not an adequate solution, however, since frequently the disagreement
is over importance and in the absence of prior standards of importance,
this might not be very helpful. Various Justices have subject mat-
ter and issue prejudices, which are already well-known, and there
would seem to be little to be gained except to bring these disagree-
ments into the open. But the idea has merit insofar as it should
encourage the statement of opinion when it becomes apparent to the
Court that many cases on a particular matter have no chance of
38. ". . . when comparison is made between the issues at stake in petitions
that have been granted and those in which petitions have been denied, the contrast
is at times glaring." NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 573 (1950)
(dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter).
39. This happened to three cases this past term.
40. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 570 (1950); Wilkerson
v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 66 (1949); Reynolds v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 336 U.S. 207,
209 (1949) ; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 384 (1949) ; United
States v. Knight, 336 U.S. 505, 510 (1949).
41. Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 110 (1951).
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success. This has been done, but infrequently.42  For example, in
Gaines v. Washington,43 Justice Taft wrote: "It has not been the
practice of the Court to write opinions and state its reasons for denying
writs of certiorari, and this opinion is not to be regarded as indicating
an intention to adopt that practice, but in view of the fact that the
Court has deemed it wise to initiate a practice for speedily disposing
of criminal cases in which there is no real basis for jurisdiction in
this Court, it was thought proper to make an exception here, not to
be repeated, and write an opinion." 4 Despite the apologetic language,
it would appear to be better for everyone concerned if this practice
were more frequently used-to advise the profession officially, rather
than in an unofficial or nonjudicial way4 5 when a broad agreement
of this type is reached.
Notwithstanding the conclusion of Professor Jaffe that a refine-
ment of standards is futile, it is proposed here to analyze Supreme
Court Rule 38-and suggest possible changes to make it more effective
in its application. It is not thought that by these or any other refine-
ments an attorney in every instance will know whether his case will
be reviewed. It is hoped, however, by these proposals, in a significant
number of instances to provide solutions, avoid bad answers, and in
general improve the existing situation.
There are six guides theoretically used at the present time"6
though none of these according to the specific language of the Rules
is individually, or combined with others, completely controlling or
limiting: 47 (1) Where a state court has decided a federal question
not yet decided by the United States Supreme Court or has decided
a case in a way probably not in accord with the Supreme Court.
(2) Conflict in the circuits. (3) Where a circuit court decides a
42. The Court's unwillingness to state reasons has been expressed many times,
e.g., by justice Frankfurter in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S.
912, 918 (1950); Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 342 U.S. 921 (1952); and Chemical
Bank and Trust Co. v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U.S. 982 (1952).
See also relevant excerpts quoted in Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court
Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 439, 441, 442 (1953).
43. 277 U.S. 81, 87 (1928).
44. See also In re Woods, 143 U.S. 202 (1892) ; Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,
165 U.S. 518 (1897); Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942).
45. Thus most of the articles on the Supreme Court quote from Chief Justice
Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, an address before the American Bar Associa-
tion on Sept. 7, 1949, printed in 69 Sup. Ct. v (1949); Hearings before Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) ; and a letter from
Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler, March 21, 1937, reprinted at 81 CONG.
REc. 2813 (1937).
46. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 38, 15.
47. These are paraphrases of the more long-winded language of U.S. Sup. Ct.
Rule 38.
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point of local law in conflict with local decisions. (4) Where the
circuit courts decide an important question not yet decided by the
Supreme Court. (5) When circuit courts decide a federal question
in a way probably in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court.
(6) When a circuit court has sanctioned another court to vary from
the usual course of judicial proceedings.
Before discussing each one of these separately, it should be noted
that all six of these criteria cut across subject matter or issue and
concern themselves, in one way or another, with the merits of the
decision of the case.48 Yet, for some reason, merit has been one of
the standards specifically rejected by the Justices when they discuss the
reasons for granting or denying certiorari. "Our rules adopted to
carry out the policy of the statutes granting the power to bring cases
here by certiorari have apprised the Bar and the public that we will
not take cases fully heard and adjudicated below for the mere purpose
of reexamining the correctness of the result." " Yet an attorney, on
looking at the criteria set up by the rules, can assume that if his
case was wrongly decided he might have a case to merit certiorari.
In view of these criteria, it is not unreasonable to assume that if
certiorari is denied, the inference may be drawn that the case is
affirmed.5" Repeated denials of dertiorari may logically have this
meaning if one takes the rule at face value. 1 Judging from the major-
ity of the briefs for certiorari, this has been recognized by many prac-
ticing attorneys. How, then, can the Court 52 say one thing when
the rule appears to state something else. The answer is that there
has been interpretation, for the most part silent, which has made cer-
tain criteria crucial, others valueless; and has resulted in certain words
being emphasized, others frequently ignored. What facts and figures
there are bear this out.
48. In the rare case when the Court does not have a quorum of six qualified
Justices [see 28 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1949) ], it appears that if a majority of those
qualified note that the case should not be heard at the next term of the Court, the
judgment of the court below is affirmed. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (Supp. 1949). See
Prichard v. United States, 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
49. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 500 (1940) (opinion by Justice Roberts).
50. This inference is not compelled since there may have been too many cases
presented and thus some worthy cases rejected.
51. Moore and Oglebay give this interpretation to the meaning of certiorari.
Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of the Case, 21
TEXAS L. Rxv. 514, 533 (1943).
52. The quotation above is, of course, not just the view of Justice Roberts but
the generally accepted position.
See Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923), cited as the rule
in R BERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 588 n.8 (2d ed., Wolfson and Kurland, 1951); Vinson, Work of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 12 TExAs B.J. 551-2 (1949).
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FIRST CRITERION
Where a state court has decided a question of substance not
yet decided by the United States Supreme Court or has decided a
case in a way probably not in accord with the Supreme Court:--
Certiorari to state courts generally has been restricted. The figures
for the past four years show over a four to one ratio of certiorari
writs issued to federal courts to those granted to state courts. 3  This
is in comparison to a five to four ratio of petitions for certiorari to
federal courts to petitions for writs to state courts. 4 Of writs issued
to state courts, the figures show a two to one ratio of reversals to
affirmances, 55 pointing to a strong accent on merit as the determinant
in the granting of the writ. This is further emphasized in an interest-
ing dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari recorded by Justices
Black and Douglas this past term. Following the record of denial
of certiorari to Du. Bois v. Mossey"5 is the following: "Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari and reverse
the judgment on grounds that petitioners have been denied a trial
by jury which the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution is intended
to guarantee." "' Similarly, the same Justices in a memorandum
opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Isserman v. Ethics
Committee"" after stating the question involved, said,
53. See Table A infra. This ratio is the end-product of a trend begun in 1924
and made noticeable and commented upon in Frankfurter and Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1930, 45 HARV. L. REv. 271, 296 n.41
(1931).
54.
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Total certiorari petitions denied a 955 948 991 881 904
Total certiorari petitions granted b 97 144 85" 89 86
Total certiorari petitions filed 1052 1092 1076 970 990
Total filed from federal courts C 614 597 630 600 592
Total filed from state courts 438 495 446 370 398
Ratio filed from state courts to those filed from federal courts 4.2:5.8
a DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, ANN.
REP. 114, Table A 1 (1952).
b Id. at 115, Table A 1.
cld. at Table B 2.
55. See Table A infra.
56. 344 U.S. 869 (1952).
57. See also Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 905 (1952) where Justice Black noted his dissent with the statement that he
would reverse the judgment below.
58. 9 N.J. 269, 87 A2d 903, rehearing denied, 9 N.J. 316, 88 A.2d 199 (1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953).
This case had been discussed by an order to Isserman directing him to show
cause why he should not be disbarred before the United States Supreme Court.
In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953). By such proceeding, however the court would
appear to shift the burden of proof.
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cc... The record of the New Jersey proceedings before
us leaves me with the belief that the state failed to afford petitioner
the kind of a hearing required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although petitioner was allowed to
appear before a local bar committee and to present a formal answer
and make formal arguments before the State Supreme Court,
the full record persuades me that he was denied an adequate op-
portunity to confront witnesses against him and to offer evidence
in his behalf. Instead of hearing evidence and making its own
findings the state court's order was based on findings made by
a federal district judge who had summarily convicted petitioners
of contempt without a hearing. I believe that a lawyer is denied
due process when he is expelled from his profession without ever
having been afforded an opportunity to confront his accusers and
to present evidence to deny, explain or extenuate the charges
against him. See Ex Parte Robertson, 19 Wall. 505, 512-513,
and In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257."
Mr. Edwin McElwain speaks in a like vein of Justice Hughes'
practices granting certiorari: 9 ". . . occasionally he would recom-
mend the grant of certiorari in a case of no public importance what-
ever simply because the decision below was unjust, unreasonable, or
plainly wrong." 6o
Another point which has become a major focus for the Court
in applying this criterion is the implication of the phrase "question
of substance." Of the three cases, this past term which the Court
specifically stated were granted on this criterion, all mentioned "ques-
tion of substance" as being the determinant. But the significance
of this phrase is not so much in the granting of certiorari as in the
handling of appeals from the state courts."' The two problems are
similar.' Though Rule 12 applies to appeals from both federal "
and state courts,64 it is appeals from state courts which were intended
to be cut off and against which the rule has been most extensively
59. McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice
Hughes, 63 H.Av. L. Rxv. 5, 13 (1949).
60. The late Chief Justice Vinson's clerks have noted in private talks his prac-
tice of asking for the names of the judges who decided the case below, in the prepara-
tion of the memorandum of a petition for certiorari. Presumably this had little
purpose except insofar as it might bear on whether the case was correctly and rea-
sonably decided.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), (2) (Supp. 1952); U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 12.
62. They are not identical in effect, however. Appeals dismissed are adjudica-
tions on the merits and may be cited as decisions of the Supreme Court; thus, in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) the Supreme Court
granted certiorari because of the conflict between the circuit court decision and
previous per curiam dismissals.
Certiorari, is, of course, theoretically unrelated to the merits of the case.
63. Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919).
64. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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used. 5 Once again, the proportion of dismissal of appeals remains
constant0 0 and high despite the length of time in which the device
has been in existence, the bar apparently being unable to fathom the
mysterious factors which make a case insubstantial. As can be seen
from the table in the note,"' "insubstantiality" is the hurdle over which
most appeals fall." This insubstantiality often carries over to be the
determinant of dismissal for want of jurisdiction 69 and even to a
65. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1932, 47 HARV. L. R v. 245, 262 (1933). They cite the following figures:
179 out of 510 appeals failed to make the requisite proof of jurisdiction. All but
20 of these were from state courts. See note 66 infra.
66. Appeals from state courts:
Total Appeals
(Federal Appeals from Total Dismissed from
and State) State Alone Dismissed State Courts
1929 101 68 50 41
1930 115 71 50 44
1931 113 63 55 51
1932 95 53 53 38
1933 128 86 58 52
1934 85 56 41 68
1936 114 85 54 52
1937 112 72 65 51
1935 102 63 41 37
1948 82 58 45 40
1949 92 50 40 37
1950 78 49 35 33
1951 101 52 50 42
1952 87 38 37 27
Figures for 1929-37 based on the articles on the annual business of the Supreme
Court in H~Av. L. REv. (1930-1940).
Figures for 1948-1951 are based on the articles on the annual business of the Supreme
Court in HARv. L. REv. (1949-1952). These figures are at slight variance with the
total appeals listed in the official figures and those used previously in this series,
but since they include sources, they have been used here.
67.
Total Want of Subst. Want of Motion of No Ground
Dismissed Fed. Quest. Juris. Appellant Misc. Stated
1948 40 26 7 2 5 5
1949 40 21 11 0 2 3
1950 35 26 2 2 3 2
1951 50 37 5 2 4 2
1952 .37 27 5 0 4 0
Figures for the above are based on Notes on the Supreme Court in HARV. L. Rv.
(1949-1953).
68. Besides the figures given above, Ulman and Spears writing in 1940, stated
that in the decade up to that time over 400 appeals bad been dismissed on the grounds
of no substantial federal question being presented. Ulman and Spears, "Dismissed
for Want of a Substantial Federal Question," 20 B.U.L. REv. 501, 503 (1940).
69. "The distinction between an appeal affirmed in the jurisdictional statement
and one dismissed for want of a substantial federal question is obscure. Both involve
an adjudication that the claim asserted is without merit. In the latter case, sup-
posedly, the lack of merit is so plain as to amount to a want of jurisdiction; in the
former it is sufficient to furnish jurisdiction, although insufficient to justify presenta-
tion on briefs with oral argument." Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48 HARv. L. Rsv. 238, 246 n.20 (1934).
"No such distinction obtains in the treatment of district court appeals. The
requirement of a showing of substantiality is now dispensed with under the
rules. . . . An appeal in which the questions involved are 'so subtantial as not
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per curiam affirmance.7" Thus, the need for a guide to substantiality
becomes all the more pressing.
It has often 7 been noted how comparatively infrequent are re-
versals in appeals from state courts. Of the appeals which are not
dismissed the relation between affirmances and reversals is interesting.
Curiously the results are almost in exact contradiction 72 to the cer-
tiorari cases where merit seems to be of importance. Here again, the
Court usually refuses to give reasons. Usually no case or statute is
cited." In others, one or two cases may be cited; more than this
number is unusual. Furthermore, the cases cited are frequently stock
precedents affirming the right of the Court to treat an appeal summarily,
rather than going to the point in issue. But even when the cases
are on the issue, the effect of such dismissals is not such as to prevent
further petitions.74 It is recognized that not all appeals can be given
a full hearing and be disposed of by opinion. The short-cut method
is essential as in certiorari. The solution then, is to determine
standards of substance which not only can be applied by the Court but
which can be recognized by the profession.
SECOND CRITERION
Conflict in circuits:-Of the six standards in Rule 38, this is the
one most frequently mentioned by the Court in granting review. Frank-
to need further argument' is affirmed on the jurisdictional statement." Hart, The
Business of the Supreme Court at October Terns, 1937 and 1938, 53 HAnv. L. REv.
579, 601, n.41 (1939).
70. In Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U.S. 710, 716-7 (1922) the Supreme
Court made the following distinction:
"The federal question presented, being one which requires analysis and exposi-
tion for its decision, is not frivolous; and the motion to dismiss the writ of error
is accordingly denied. The motion to affirm the judgment should, however, be
granted if the questions on which the decision depends are found to be so wanting
in substance as not to need further argument."
This is cutting things a bit fine; too fine for the Harvard Law Review which
in its Note on the insubstantial federal question rejected the distinction on functional
grounds. "Since the procedure, practice, and the effect of the decision are sub-
stantially the same for both per curiam affirmances and dismissals for want of a
substantial federal question, no distinction between these two methods of disposing
of appeals is made in the following discussion." Note, The Insubstantial Federal
Question, 62 HI- v. L. REv. 488 n.7 (1949).
71. Id. at 494 n.47.
72. See Table A and B infra. In appeal cases the percentage is roughly 2:1
affirmed; in certiorari cases 2:1 reversed.
73. Thus in 1947, of the 22 appeals dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question or affirmed per curiam, 20 cases cited no case authority. Note, The Insub-
stantial Federal Question, 62 HARv. L. Rlv. 488, 489 (1949).
74. Professor Hart illustrates this by the attempts to bring the flag salute cases
before the Court and argues that psychologically the effect of these cryptic ad-
judications is to stimulate repeated efforts to have the case fully argued before the
Court. "To earnest litigants, orders without reasons entered without plenary
hearing do not carry the same conviction as a reasoned opinion." Hart, The Busi-
ness of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 HARv. L. REV.
579, 605 (1940).
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furter and Hart writing on the 1927-32 terms stated that it appeared
to be the reason for the grant of certiorari in more than half of the
cases which they studied7 In subsequent articles the following figures
are cited: In 24 cases plus 8 companion cases out of 45 cases where
reason for review was given, conflict of circuits was stated to be the
reason for review; 76 20 out of 39; 77 and 15 out of 45 .78 This past
term, of the 35 cases in which a reason was stated for the granting of
review, conflict in circuits accounted for 14. These figures appear
so significant 79 that one might legitimately infer that it is normally
a sufficient condition-controlling despite the preamble to Rule 38-
to compel review. Modem text writers on the Supreme Court juris-
diction seem convinced of this. Thus, Stern and Gressman say,
"The Supreme Court will usually grant certiorari where the decision
of the federal court of appeals, as to which review is sought, is in
direct conflict with a decision of another court of appeals on the same
matter of federal law or on the same matter of general law as to which
federal courts can exercise independent judgments. . . . the Court
does not feel itself very free to deny review in the face of a square
and irreconcilable conflict . 8, . 0 Robertson and Kirkham state
the rule even more strongly: "Where the decision of the Court of
Appeals sought to be reviewed by certiorari directly conflicts, upon a
question of federal law,"1 with the decision of another Court of Appeals
on the same question, the Supreme Court grants certiorari as of course,
and irrespective of the importance of the question of law involved." 82
Lawyers, too, seem to follow this theory. In almost every brief for
certiorari, there is an effort to find a conflict in circuits. And as far
as the possibilities of telling when there is a direct conflict we are
75. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1933, 48 HAgv. L. REv. 238, 267 n.72 (1934).
76. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1934, 49 HAv. L. REv. 68, 86 n.38 (1935).
77. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 595 n.32 (1938).
78. Ibid.
79. See also ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREEIx COURT
OF THE UNIrr STATES 632 n.10 et seq. (2d ed., Wolfson and Kurland, 1951).
80. STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTICE: 101 (1st ed. 1950). The
qualification is in cases where the conflict is with a decision which is discredited byreason of intervening decisions of the Supreme Court or other courts of appeal or
with a decision which is obsolete.
81. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 206 (1938). In which the
Court said: "As to questions controlled by state law, however, conflict among thecircuits is not of itself a reason for granting a writ of certiorari. The conflict may
be merely corollary to a permissible difference of opinion in the state courts."
An inference might be drawn from this that where federal law is concerned con-
flict in the circuits is a sufficient condition to require the granting of the writ.
82. ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 78, at 629.
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told that "for skilled lawyers, the issue of conflict, in the great majority
of cases, comes close to mechanical determination." I
Such a simple rule would be welcome; at least one instance of
clarity amidst confusion. Unfortunately, it doesn't work out that way.
Each year there are many cases which arise where a conflict in circuits
exists but no writ is issued. Conflict in an important case is what is
necessary, although Rule 38 does not say so.
Many commentators have given evidence that conflict is not the
ticket to the Supreme Court. As early as 1933 Frankfurter and Hart
questioned it, and pointed to "importance" as being significant, citing
cases of conflict where no writ was granted, presumably because the
issue in dispute was a minor and technical one."4 More recently the
list of such denials has grown. Mr. Stern, in a recent article,8 5 admitting
the rashness of the generalization in his treatise, has cited seven further
cases 86 of admitted conflicts; and this series of articles has pointed out
similar cases " of denial despite the conflict. If these alone are not suffi-
cient to eliminate the possibility of a mechanical operation of certiorari,
statements of the Court itself lend further weight. First, there is the
tendency of the Court to stretch the concept in cases where certiorari
has been granted; the writ is granted on an "asserted conflict in prin-
83. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 596 (1938).
84. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Term, 1933, 48 HARv. L. REV. 238, 268 n.73 (1934): ". . . the Court denied
certiorari, [on a question of the sufficiency of an indictment] despite the admission
of conflict by the Government, where the only effect of lack of uniformity was to
require district attorneys in certain circuits, in drafting indictments, to add a few
words not elsewhere necessary," citing Carnahan v. United States, 281 U.S. 723
(1930) ; Capo v. United States, 281 U.S. 769 (1930) ; Malinow v. United States, 282
U.S. 875 (1930).
85. Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 468 (1953).
86. He lists: United States v. Abrams, 197 F.2d 803 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 855 (1952); United States v. Community Services, Inc., 189 F.2d 421
(4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952); Sokol Bros. Furniture Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 185 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 952 (1951); Beal v. United States, 182 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952) ; Arlington v. Mayer, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965 (1950)
(no lower court opinion) ; NLRB v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, 195 F.2d 350 (5th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 863 (1952).
87. Jackson v. Ruthazer, Warden, 181 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 339
U.S. 980 (1950) ; Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 828 (1950), cited in Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 293, 301 (1950). See also Consumer-
Farmer Milk Cooperative, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 186 F.2d 68
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951), in conflict with the United States
v. Pickwick Electrical Membership Corporation, 158 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1946).
In addition to United States v. Abrams, cited by Stern, supra note 86, in the
following cases this term, certiorari was denied despite the existence of a conflict:
Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Lange, 196 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 834 (1952); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith,
194 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952).
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ciple,""8 a "seeming conflict," 8 "statements made. . which
seemed to conflict with the conclusion below," o and an "alleged con-
flict" 1 in which the case alleged to be in conflict is not discussed at
all. In these cases "conflict" seems to be a pseudonym for importance.
Then there are cases where certiorari is granted because of conflict
and then, as if this is not enough, because of their importance also.92
This bi-lateral reason was given in three of the 14 writs granted on
this point in the past term. The safe " conclusion seems to be that
a gloss had been placed on a "conflict of circuits" so that it is fading
into the "importance" of the issue.
THIRD CRITERION
Where a circuit court decides a point of local law in conflict
with local decisions:-This standard seems almost valueless; judging
from the few available statistics, it is rarely applied. In the Thirties,
Frankfurter and Hart said that there were "few" cases on this issue; 94
that it was of "little importance" since rarely cited by the Court
as a reason 5 for review. In 1935 and 1936 of 39 and 45 cases
respectively for which reasons were given for the granting of cer-
tiorari, this reason was mentioned once each term.. This past
term it was not stated at all as a reason for granting review. Under
Erie v. Tompkins,"7 the question usually is whether the federal or
88. United States v. Bruno, 329 U.S. 207, 208 (1946) (Italics added).
89. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 389 (1947) (Italics added).
90. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945) (Italics added).
91. Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631, 633
(1949) (Italics added).
92. New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949); Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1945); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946);
NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947); United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947). But in Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western
Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923) the Court spoke as if there were only two
standards for certiorari and that they were mutually exclusive and sufficient to
gain review: ". . . it is very important that we be consistent in not granting the
writ of certiorari except in cases involving principles the settlement of which is of
importance to the public as distinguished from that of the parties, and in cases where
there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit
courts of appeal. The present case comes under neither head."
93. Apparently not so safe. Despite this evidence a recent article in The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Reziew takes the position that a conflict will compel cer-
tiorari, distingushing Stern's listings on the grounds that they were not direct, nar-
row conflicts. Roehner and Roehner, Certiorari, What is a Conflict between Cir-
cuits?, 20 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 656 (1953).
94. Frankfurter and Hart, The Buiness of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1933, 48 HARV. L. REv. 238, 270 and n.78 (1934).
95. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1934, 49 HARV. L. REv. 68, 86 (1935).
96. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 H~Av. L. REv. 577, 595 n.32 (1938).
97. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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state law applies, rather than what the local law is. 98 These cases
are diversity cases-at least where this argument becomes the sole
basis for certiorari. In 1950, one diversity case was heard; 9 in
1951, two; 10 and this past term only one of 52 1 petitions was
granted. Of these four,' only one-the 1950 case-might con-
ceivably 103 have gained review on this ground.
FOURTH CRITERION
Where the circuit court decides an important question not yet
decided by the Supreme Court.--Once the mystifying and blanketing
word "important" comes into play, the possibility for the use of the
criterion expands also. Frankfurter and Hart found some 8 or 9
cases reviewed on this ground in 1933.104 In 1935, 15 105 were found
to have been reviewed on this ground; in 1936, 25.10' This past
term it was the stated reason 16 out of 35 times.0 7 One of the interest-
ing observations made by the authors was the subject matter prefer-
ence implicitly followed by the Court in the application of this standard
-with patent cases almost never being reviewed, except where there
was a conflict in the circuits'
FIFTH CRITERION
Where the circuit court decides a federal question in a way
probably in conflict with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court:-
98. ROERTSON AND KIRKHAM, Op. cit. supra note 78, at 648. They cite no com-
parative figures for the statement but do give many of the cases decided under Erie v.
Tompkins as evidence.
99. Note, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 182 (1952).
100. Note, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARv. L. RFv. 89, 180 (1953).
101. This figure excludes all cases in which any federal question or constitutional
argument was raised in the petition. Since frequently a perfunctory constitutional
argument is raised to dress up the case (e.g., the decision below for the plaintiff being
so far against the weight of the evidence results in a taking without due process
of law) if one were to eliminate review of diversity cases the number of petitions to be
eliminated would undoubtedly be close to 70.
102. Some four cases-although probably more-were taken in 1948 based on 63
HARv. L. REv. 119, 125-7 (1950). None of these involved the application of this
standard, however. The three arising under the application of Erie v. Tompkins were
questions of whether federal or state law applied; the other raising constitutional
issues.
103. The table is ambiguous on this point, it does eliminate a constitutional issue.
104. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Termn,
1933, 48 HAx v. L. REv. 238, 272 n.84 (1934).
105. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 595 n.32 (1938).
106. Ibid.
107. If one includes also the three cases in which it is combined as a reason with
conflict in circuits and once when combined with a Supreme Court decision, the figure
reaches 20, over one half of the cases in which reasons were given.
108. Frankfurter and Hart, supra note 104, at 271.
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To a large extent this overlaps with the problem of the conflict in
circuits; the two are frequently mentioned together. 9 It is, however,
often used alone, in 1933 having been explicitly mentioned six times; 110
in 1934, nine times; "I in 1935, three; 112 in 1936, four; :" in 1952,
twice, once combined with "importance." 114 Perhaps because of the
injection of this latter, Frankfurter and Hart stated that it was difficult
to know when certiorari would be granted." 5 The difficulty, of course,
is whether the facts of the later case are so different as to make the
earlier Supreme Court action inapplicable." 6
SIXTH CRITERION
When a circuit court has departed itself or sanctioned another
court to vary from the usual course of judicial proceedings:-There is
little to say concerning this except that it is just not used-at least
no one has shown its explicit application by the Supreme Court.
Frankfurter and Hart 1 7 found no case where it was used; and it
was completely absent as a stated reason during this past term.
The conclusion to be drawn from this description of the operation
of Rule 38 in practice is this. That actually the rule has only two
standardk at most: the "substance" or "importance" of the question
presented, and conflict in circuits. That the second to a large extent
has also become a matter of "importance" seems clear. The word
"important" is undefined, the Court seldom giving concrete meaning
to the phrase which actually is crucial to petitioning lawyers. How-
ever, informed guesses may be made.
From the discussion above and the table below,""' one element
of importance in the Court's view can safely be said to be the merit
of the decision below. In short, as Mr. Micawber would say, "who
won?" This is despite the frequent admonition of the Court to the
contrary, but quite in accord with the real thrust of Rule 38. It
also seems to be recognized by attorneys who regularly argue in their
109. Id. at 272 n.86 (cites 11 cases for the year 1933 when two were mentioned
together).
110. Id. at 272 n.85.
111. Frankfurter and Hart, The Bu, iness of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1934, 49 HARv. L. REv. 68, 87 n.39 (1935).
112. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business bf the Supreme Court at the October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HAav. L. Ray. 577, 595 n.32 (1938).
113. Ibid.
114. This raises the same questions as were considered under conflict of circuits,
supra. Here a solution is less pressing since this reason is urged infrequently.
115. Frankfurter and Hart, supra n6te 104, at 273.
116. Ibid.
117. Id. at 274; Frankfurter and Hart, supra note 111, at 83 n.37.
118. Table A infra.
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briefs the unjustness or justness of the decision below."' Strangely
enough, the emphasis on merit occurs with a strange twist in the
case of appeals.' Of those not dismissed 63% are affirmed and 37%
are reversed, the exact opposite from certiorari. This may be explained
by the fact that there seems to be a feeling of need for maintaining
the delicate balance between the state and the federal courts and there-
fore of a reluctance to reverse state action. Also in appeals from
the federal courts-most of which are from three judge district courts
-the issue of substantiality has already been argued out. This may
not only .account for the less frequent dismissal of federal appeals,
but also, for less stress on merit, because of the limited discretion to
choose. This, however, does not explain the strong percentage of
affirmance to reversal.
TABLE A 12'
DECISIONS OF THE COURT AFTER GRANTING CERTIORARI
Cases from Federal 5 year 5 year
Courts: 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 total pct.
Affirmed 34 32 28 45 30 169 36%
Reversed 75 52 61 55 56 299 64%
Total 109 84 89 100 86 468
Cases from State
Courts:
Affirmed 15 10 3 5 10 43 35%
Reversed 29 7 17 15 12 80 65%
Total 44 17 20 20 22 123
Cases from both Federal
and State Courts:
Affirmed 49 42 31 50 40 212 36%
Reversed 104 59 78 70 68 379 64%
Total 153 101 109 120**108** 591
119. Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 1947-8, 16 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 1,
34 (1948-9).
120. Table B infra.
121. Figures for the 1948 term are based on table in 63 HARv. L. REv. 119, 122
(1949) (Table II).
** The difference between this figure and that given in Table II as to number of
certiorari granted is explained by the fact that three cases were granted certiorari
and later dismissed without a ruling on the merits.
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TABLE B 122
DISPOSITION OF CASES ON APPEAL
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 5yearpct.
Federal Courts:
Affirmed 9 27 15 27 28 64%
Reversed 10 12 12 14 11 36%
Total 19 39 27 41 39
State Courts:
Affirmed 12 7 11 6 7 63%
Reversed 6 6 5 4 4 37%
Total 18 13 16 10 11
Federal and
State Courts:
Affirmed 21 34 26 33 35 63%
Reversed 16 18 17 18 15 37%
Total 37 52 43 51 50
The Court has indicated another touchstone of importance namely,
numbers: either the number of cases litigated or likely to be litigated
on the issue, or the number of people affected by the decision.' Thus,
the Court has stated: "We granted certiorari because determination
of the issue raised here will guide adjustment of a large body of
similar claims now pending." 124 Of the 16 cases this term, explicitly
granted because of the importance of the issue, six were on this basis.'25
122. Figures for the 1948 term are based on table in 63 HARv. L. REv. 119,
122 (1949) (Table II).
123. Because of their similar position to the plaintiff or defendant.
124. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421, 423 (1949). Also Ludecke
v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 162 n.2 (1948) ("We are advised that there are 530 alien
enemies, ordered to depart from the United States, whose disposition awaits the out-
come of this case.").
125. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, and International Union, United Automobile,
Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330, 333 (1953) (". . because of the widespread use of the contractual provisions
comparable to those before us, and because of the general importance of the issue in
relation to collective bargaining."); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC and
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., and Virginia REA Ass'n v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 155
(1953) ("Determination of the issues may affect a substantial number of important
potential sites for the development of hydroelectric power."); Calmar Steamship Corp.
v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427, 428 (1953).
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Another factor which seems to influence the Court is the severity
of the penalty imposed on the individual petitioners in criminal cases.
This is natural even if its importance is denied.'26 The figures below
may be misleading to a degree, since most of the criminal cases prob-
ably arise on the Miscellaneous Docket,1 7 in in form pauperis, and
are not included here. Of the eleven capital cases on the Appellate
Docket this past term, certiorari was granted in nine.2 Last year,
although comparative figures are not available, four capital cases
were reviewed by the Court.' 29 The sentences in these cases may
not have been controlling although it is the opinion of the authors
that in federal cases at least, 3 ' the right of review of a criminal sen-
126. Frankfurter, J., in a memorandum opinion to the denial in Rosenberg v.
United States, 344 U.S. 889 (1953) said:
"Petitioners are under death sentence, and it is not unreasonable to feel that before
life is taken review should be open in the highest court of the society which has
condemned them. Such right of review was the law of the land for twenty
years. . . . But in 1911 Congress abolished the appeal as of right, and since then
death sentences have come here only under the same conditions that apply to any
criminal conviction in a federal court." But see McElwain, The Business of the
Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HAmv. L. Rxv. 5, 13 n.14
(1949) : ". . . occasionally he would recommend the grant of certiorari in a case of
no public importance whatever simply because the decision below was unjust, unrea-
sonable, or plainly wrong." Then in the footnote McElwain continues: "The great
majority of these were capital cases . . . in which the accused had not been ade-
quately represented by counsel and in which there had been an obvious miscarriage of
justice. . . . [Then follows an extraordinary apology for Hughes' practice.] The
grant of certiorari in such cases is not contrary to the Rules in view of Rule
38. . . ." (Italics added).
127. The late Chief Justice Vinson estimated one term that almost half of the
1597 cases before the Court were prisoner applications. Address before the American
Bar Association, St. Louis Daily Record, Sept. 8, 1949, p. 6, col. 1.
The Note, The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARv. L. REv. 119 (1949) re-
viewing the 1948 term lists prisoner applications at about 500.
128. Daniels v. Allen, Brown v. Allen, and Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) ; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) ; Stein
v New York, Wissner v. New York, and Cooper v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953);
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 138 (1953).
The two cases denied certiorari were: United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1953) (Black dissenting) ; 200 F2d 666,
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953) (Douglas and Black dissenting); and Paris v.
Texas, 249 S.W.2d 217 (Texas Cr. App.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 857 (1952)
(Douglas dissenting).
Douglas especially seems to be impressed with the importance of review when
inhumane treatment or brutality is in issue. Contrast his dissent in Sweeney v.
Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91 (1952) with the per curiam opinion of the Court and the
cold balancing of state and federal interests in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence,
id. at 90.
129. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952) ; Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) ; Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
130. This was formerly the case, from 1889-1911. But the statute was repealed
on the ground that too much of the Court's time was being expended on the flood
of cases reviewed on this basis. In the early years, probably because of the backlog,
there was a large number but afterwards only a trickle. Thus, 51 capital cases were
reviewed in 1891; 17 capital cases were reviewed in 1894; 4 capital cases were re-
viewed from 1908 to 1911.
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tence should be granted as a matter of course by the Supreme Court,131
similar to the practice in New York.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION
It is suggested that the importance of the case should be deter-
mined by analyzing it in terms of the following dichotomy-the subject
matter and the issue or the interrelationship of the two.
TABLE OF ISSUES AND SUBJECT MATTER BREAKDOWN
A. Issues:
a. Conflict of circuits- (Actually this includes Issue or Subject
Matter but is listed here for ease of handling)
b. Conflict between two laws:
i. federal v. state law
ii. state or federal law v. Constitution
iii. regulation v. federal or state law
iv. contract v. federal or state law or regulation







e. Sufficiency of evidence
B. Subject Matter:
1. capital cases
2. First Amendment freedoms and racial questions





131. A similar extension to state capital offenses would probably be impractical,
entailing the review of some 90-100 cases per year. JULIA E. JOHNSON, CAPrrAL
PUNISHMENT n.29 (1939). Also by the time they reach the Supreme Court state
cases may have been reviewed twice; in the federal cases, only once.
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8. patents and trademarks
9. bankruptcy
10. common law federal questions (Tort Claims Act, FELA,
Jones Act, etc.)
11. common law topics (diversity cases covering a host of fields,
Torts, Contracts, Property, etc.)
By relating issue and subject matter (A and B) it is hoped to
locate the case on a graph of. relative importance, comparable to the
method by which the x and y grid network in the Cartesian system de-
termines a point. For example, FELA cases which involve the question
of whether the FELA completely covers the field or whether state law
applies-b, 10- would be conceded to be more important than FELA
cases Where only the sufficiency of evidence is involved-e, 10. Sim-
ilarly a bankruptcy case in which the question whether the New York
statute of limitations or the federal statute applies-b(i), 9- is more
important than a similar case where that which is sought to be reviewed
is the feasibility of a plan of re-organization--e, 9. The reverse is also
true. A sufficiency of evidence question in a torts case-e, 1-may
not be reviewed whereas the same question in a capital case-e, 1-
may be looked into in great detail. These examples are clear-cut and
to some extent represent the actual if not the systematic practice of the
Court.13 2  In close cases, an analysis which combines on the one side
subject matter, and on the other, issue, may permit a Justice to examine
the certiorari petition with a view toward consistency which, in the
long run, will give lawyers an idea of what is meant by "importance."
As already stated, it is the authors' view that in capital cases
arising under federal statutes regardless of the question of law raised
by the petition, the writ should -issue. This should add about two to
five cases to the Court's docket for a year.
132. An interesting study-too complex to be considered here-is the varying
review of the findings of fact depending on the subject matter and even in some cases
the issue involved.
Compare the statements of the Court in the review of findings in capital and
criminal cases with those in tort cases. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Chicago G.W.R.R. v. Rambo, 298 U.S.
99 (1936); Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 285 U.S. 127 (1932).
See also the varying applicability of the two court rule in patent or common
law cases and in denaturalization cases. Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267, 268
(1949) ; Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 214 (1947);
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) ; Knauer v. United States, 328
U.S. 654, 657 (1945). See also Admiralty Rule 46 2, 28 U.S.C.A. (1911).
On the different review depending on the issue-whether it is based on the
construction of a federal statute or whether state legislation is questioned as unconsti-
tutional-see, Note, 55 HARv. L. REV. 644 (1942). Also Stem, Review of Findings
of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv.
70 (1944).
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Despite the infrequency with which certiorari is granted in diver-
sity cases, the Court's time is nonetheless wasted by the certiorari
petitions which regularly are filed and which involve only common
law issues.13 3 It would seem that in these cases regardless of the
issue involved certiorari should be denied.' Such a policy by the
Court expressed either in a memorandum opinfon 15 or as a rule 136
would result in the elimination, speaking conservatively, of some 60
to 80 petitions a year. A valid exception could be made in Erie v.
Tompkins cases.
FELA; Tort Claims Act; Jones Act; Federal Safety Appliance
Act; Admiralty:--These cases are similar to those involving common
law topics discussed above. They make up a large number-about 50
to 90 annually-of the petitions for certiorari with a proportionately
large number of writs granted. Their similarity to common law cases
would seem to warrant a similar disposition, but as seen in the table,3 '
a substantial proportion of the opinions of the Court each year-about
10 cases, or 10 per cent-is concerned with cases under these statutes.
Review of FELA cases has long been opposed by Justice Frank-
furter. He singled out this type of case for criticism while he was
a law teacher and has continued his opposition on the bench-refusing






1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
2 10 13 10 12 7 6 13 15 5 2 4 2 1 3
133 85 82 113 130 122 110 99 105 113 Not Available 77
135 95 95123142129116112120118 80
134. The Court formerly asserted such a blanket denial in the common law cases
which sought review on the grounds that the decision was a violation of due process.
But apparently even this is not to be relied on. 54 HARv. L. RFv. 1066 (1941).
135. Similar to the Taft opinion in Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159,
163 (1923).














1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
6 7 18 5 7 1 5 3 3 0 5 5 1 1 3
30 47 45 49 37 29 25 20 25 20 11
36 54 63 54 44 30 30 23 28 20 14
1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
0 2 2 1 3
15
18
1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
2 0 0 1 1
5
6
454 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
not have been granted. 8' Many of these cases involve merely the
sufficiency of evidence.3 9 They are time consuming since they involve
the complete review of the record. Since the time of the Court, we
are told, is so precious,"4 and since the result cannot be generalized
beyond the particular case, the review of this type of case seems un-
justifiable. 4  Denial'would mean elimination of 30 to 40 petitions a
year." Where the issue involves solely the construction of the Act
-d- almost always a question of coverage, the writ might well be
restricted to those cases where there is a conflict of circuits recognized
by the court of appeals or perhaps where there is a dissenting opinion
below."'
Admiralty 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 10 3 10 5 6 8 4 2 2 1 3 1 2 6 3
Cert. Denied 23 34 34 23 25 25 23 22 18 7 11.
Total 33 37 44 28 31 33 27 24 20 8 14
Federal Safety Appli-
ance Act 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 0 0
Cert. Denied 4
Total 4
138. Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 336 U.S. 911 (1949). See also his
grudging vote in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 64 (1949); Reynolds v.
Atlantic Coast Line M.R., 336 U.S. 207, 209 (1949).
139. Fifty-five petitions for certiorari in FELA suits were presented on this
issue alone from 1943 through the 1947 term. Twenty of these were granted cer-
tiorari, a phenomenal percentage of 379. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 70
(1949) (Douglas, J. concurring).
The Court did it again this year, reviewing the same issue in one FELA case in
Stone v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis R.R., 344 U.S. 407 (1953). See also
the denial of certiorari in Jaroszewski v. Central Railroad of N.J., 344 U.S. 839
(1952). Justice Black dissented from the refusal to review.
Yet in New York ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 303 U.S. 158
(1938), the Court dismissed the appeal because sufficiency of evidence to support a
jury finding did not raise a substantial federal question.
140. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J. concurring).
Justice Frankfurter would extend the denial of certiorari in sufficiency of evi-
dence questions to other subject matter areas. United States v. Knight, 336 U.S.
505, 509 (1949) (refusing to record his vote where sufficiency of evidence to convict
for violation of the Bankruptcy Act was the subject of the suit); Nye & Nissen
v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 622 (1949) (refusal to review 4,630 pages on
sufficiency of evidence in another criminal prosecution).
Where there is no such burden of review apparently he would look to the
sufficiency of the evidence even in FELA cases. Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 336 U.S. 207, 209 (1949).
141. Review is quite plainly, almost expressly, based on merit; the Court re-
versing in every case except one (4 justices dissenting in that one) where a court
held the defendant entitled to a directed verdict.
The cases for the years 1942 through 1945 are discussed in Griswold v. Gardner,
155 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1946).
142. See note 137 supra.
143. This is not the same as the New York rule. There, a dissent in the Ap-
pellate Division gives an automatic appeal to the highest court. We suggest a more
stringent operation: a dissenting opinion first permits one to ask for certiorari.
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Because of the persuasive weight of one circuit court case on
another, it could be assumed that if a circuit court refuses to follow
the lead of another, the issue is not trivial. There is, however, a
difficulty here. Almost every brief in support of certiorari cites cases
in "direct conflict" with the one at bar. The solution, in the opinion
of the authors, is to make the determination of the direct conflict
in this field-and in others to be mentioned below-depend on the
circuit court judges themselves. This can be done in either of two
ways: (1) by considering the petition for certiorari if the case is
cited in the opinion below as in conflict, or (2) by requiring a juris-
dictional statement from the circuit court acknowledging the possible
conflict. If the issues are any of the variants of b, the usual latitude
of discretion should prevail.'
The Court has stated that in patent cases where the issue is one
of infringement it will not ordinarily review the case unless there
is a conflict of circuits.'45  Review of patent cases .4" has dropped
considerably in recent years and probably the number of certiorari
petitions has also decreased. 4 7 However, where the question is one
of law no such requirement is necessary. 4 " Whether or not this is
wise, the point is that the Court here has clarified the matter for
the lawyer.
The Court's consistent preference for taxation, criminal law, and
labor cases might be noted. There has been an increased interest
in anti-trust and in recent years a corresponding refusal to accept
bankruptcy cases.' 49 This last tendency has provoked the suggestion
in this series previously that review in this type of case be entirely
eliminated except where there is a conflict in the circuits, admitted
by the court of appeals.
144. Some degree of discretion is always necessary. It is not hoped to convert
certiorari into a push-pull, click-click operation. Time factors among other things
may dictate a refusal of certiorari in an important case.
145. ROBERTSON AND KIIXHAM, op. cit. supra note 78, at 701.
146. There seems to be some doubt as to the power of review of the Supreme
Court of patent cases from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. ROBERTSON
AND KmrHAm, op. cit. supra note 78, at 442 et seq.
147.
Patents 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 10 3 4 3 4 15 10 3 11 12 3 3 1 1 3
Cert. Denied 22 31 32 41 36 31 35 28 48 39 19
Total 32 34 36 44 40 46 45 31 57 51 22
148. RoBERTsoN AND KIRKHAm, op. cit. supra note 78, at 707.
149.
Taxation 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 59 57 30 55 56 28 49 28 42 28 15 11 7 5 16
Cert. Denied 108 115 129 125 172 135 169 108 105 113 50
Total 167 172 159 180 228 163 218 136 147 141 66
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It is obvious that certain subjects become more or less important,
as a result of "changing conditions and new legislation. Review thus
must be somewhat cyclical. Erie v. Tompkins '150 and then a series
of cases explaining it; Taft-Hartley and then a burst of cases inter-
preting it are examples. Certain statutes immediately clamor for
construction-many people are seriously affected. Other statutes
are slower to take effect-the Patent Act ' perhaps, or a code of
civil procedure.
If the Court wishes to do more than complain about the many
petitions filed which probably are "unimportant," it will have to
recognize that Rule 38 as interpreted gives no standard whatsoever
and that 'something has to be done so that the bar can understand
"importance." The type of explanation should be twofold; first, a
statement of reasons when certiorari is granted; second, periodically,
in certain areas where decision has been reached not to grant certiorari,
a memorandum opinion notifying the bar to this effect. The type of
statement or memorandum opinion has been suggested above-one
which is specific and directed toward the combination of the subject
matter of the case and the issue presented in the case. Additional
policies have been suggested in previous articles in this series. It is
estimated that if these policies were followed, some 100 to 200 petitions
a year would be eliminated and a corresponding amount of the Court's
time and clients' money saved.
Crim. Law and Procedure* '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 5 2 1 4 4 2 7 20 4 24 16 39 22 17
Cert. Denied 28 30 28 49 53 50 33 71 91 87
Total 33 32 29 53 57 52 40 91 95 104
Labor '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 9 7 12 16 11 5 18
Cert. Denied 6 7 35
Total 15 14 53
Bankruptcy 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 0 6 4 11 7 26 16 19 5 11 5 1 1 0 3
Cert. Denied 33 22 20 34 49 49 72 82 71 57 17
Total 33 28 24 45 56 75 88101 76 68 20
Anti-Trust 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52
Cert. Granted 3 1 0 2 4 3 2 4 1 0 4 2 4 8 4
Cert. Denied 4 7 3 2 0 6 2 6 0 3 14
Total 7 8 3 4 4 9 4 10 1 3 18
* One cannot tell about what was included in these figures in past years and hence
whether they are really comparable.
150. See note 97 supra.
151. See Turini v. Allens Mfg. Co., 198 F.2d 491 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied
345 U.S. 917 (1953) (refusing to review the provisions of the new Patent Act of
1952).
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CONCLUSION
In concluding this and the series of articles on the Supreme Court
certiorari jurisdiction, the writers humbly acknowledge the magnitude
and complexity of the Court's problem. It is easy to criticize-
especially when there is so much room for it-but the answer is not
so easy. There is little doubt that the behavior of the Court in this
area is unsatisfactory-even to the Justices themselves. It may be
that the meaning of a "certiorari denied" will always be disputed;
that explanations of action taken or not taken cannot always feasibly
be made; that what goes on behind the purple curtain may forever
remain somewhat of a mystery. Perhaps, if these things are true,
it is one of the inevitable compromises that must be made by men
striving to be free in an epoch of complexity and anxiety. One point
remains clear: the work which the Supreme Court does not do is as
important as the work which it does.
Following are the usual facts and figures on the Court's non-
feasance for the 1952 term.
WORK OF THE TERM
TABLE I






By per curiam orders or opinions
By motion to dismiss or by stipulation







By transfer to appellate docket
By per curiam order or opinion
By denial or dismissal of certiorari













458 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
1950 1951 1952
3. Original Docket
Total cases 13 9 11
Cases disposed of 5 0 0
Remaining on docket 8 9 11
4. All Dockets
Total cases (Sum of 1-2-3) 1335 1368 1437
Cases disposed of 1216 1222 1286
Remaining on dockets 119 146 151
TABLE II
PER CURIAM ORDERS OR OPINIONS
1949 1950 1951 1952
1. Total orders or opinions 92 77 99 82
2. Merits actually argued:
Certiorari cases:
Affirmed after argument 5 5 7 7
Reversed after argument 4 2 7 1
Certiorari granted, continued to
next term 0 2 2 0
Motion for reconsideration continued 0 1 0 0
Appeal cases:
Affirmed after argument 5 0 4 2
Reversed after argument 3 1 3 1
Dismissed after argument 0 0 2 0
Dismissed but certiorari later granted 0 1 0 0
Total-merits argued 17 12 25 11
3. Disposed of without argument:
Certiorari cases:
Reversed, remanded, or dismissed on
motion 13 21 12 16
Affirmed 0 0 0 1
Appeal cases:
Dismissed 38 32 41 36
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part 0 1 0 0
Affirmed 23 9 15 13
Reversed 1 2 6 2
Judgment vacated and dismissed 0 0 0 1
Motion to intervene denied 0 0 0 1
Asked to state its views in argument,
else reversal; case later argued 0 0 0 1
Total-merits not argued 75 65 74 71
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TABLE III
DISPOSITION WITH AND WITHOUT ARGUMENT ON MERITS
1950 1951 1952




Per curiam opinions or orders
Total
2. Cases disposed of without hearing
argument on the merits:
Denied certiorari, Appellate Docket




Denied or withdrew other applications,
Miscellaneous Docket
Disposed of by per curiam orders or
opinions
Total
3. Total cases disposed of*
4. Of all cases disposed of, the percentage










ANALYSIS OF THE RULINGS OF THE COURT DURING
GRANTING AND DENYING REVIEW
1. Cases granting review:
Appellate Docket:
Appeals:




















* The difference between these figures and the "total disposed of" in Table I is ac-
counted for by the double inclusion in the Official Statistics (Table I) of the Mis-
cellaneous Docket cases transferred to the Appellate Docket upon the granting of
certiorari.





Total certioraris granted review
Total cases granted review
2. Cases denying review:
Appellate Docket:
Appeals:
Dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question
Not made in time-28 U. S. C. 2101 (c)






Total cases denied review
















All cases on the Appellate Docket
Disposed of on the merits
Disposed of by denial of
certiorari
Remaining on docket at term
end




Percentage work left undone
All cases on the Miscellaneous
Dockets
Disposed of on the merits
Disposed of by denial of
certiorari
1949 1950 1951 1952
867 783 827 863
201 192 196 197
556 495 518 545
96 113 121









568 539 532 563
7 17 20 13














1954] WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO IN 1952
Disposed of by denial or with-
drawal of other applications
Remaining on docket at term
end




Percentage cases disposed by
denial or withdrawal of other
applications
Percentage work left undone
1949 1950 1951 1952
108 121 102 103
17 15 24 19












COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ON DENIALS OF REVIEW







Total denials of review










556 495 518 545
436 386 386 428
41 33 41 37
1033 914 945 1010
87.6% 86.5% 85.6% 86.4%
TABLE V-C
Total rulings on review
Rulings on applications
for other relief (Mis-
cellaneous Docket)
Total rulings on review
or relief















1287 1178 1212 1272 4949
1033 914 945 1010 3902
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1949 1
Refusals of other relief
(Miscellaneous Docket) 108
Total denials of review
or relief 1141
Percentage of total rulings
that are denials of re-
view or relief 89% 8
4 year
1951 1952 total
121 102 103 434
1035 1047 1113 4336
7.8% 86.4% 87.5% 87.6%,
DISSENT TO THE ACTION OF THE COURT IN DENYING REVIEW
A. By INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES 4 year
1949 1950 1951 1952 total
Total cases 34 33 41 32 140
Black 30 22 35 25 112
Douglas 15 21 20 24 80
Reed 3 4 3 4 14
Burton 1 1 3 2 7
Jackson 1 0 2 1 4
Vinson 0 0 1 0 1
Clark 0 0 1 0 1
Minton 0 0 0 0 0
Frankfurter 0 0 0 0 0
Total justices dissenting 50 48 65 56 219
B. COMBINATIONS OF JUSTICES BY CASES
1949 1950 1951
Black alone 15 9 18
Douglas alone 2 8 3
Reed alone 1 2 0
Burton alone 1 1 0
Black and Douglas 12 11 14
Black, Douglas and Reed





Jackson, Burton and Vinson
Jackson, Reed and Clark
Jackson and Reed

































34 33 41 32 140
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a SUBJECT MATTER OF CASES FROM THE APPELLATE DOCKET
GRANTED AND DENIED REVIEW
Opinion
Denied Written Total
Admiralty 11 3 14
Shipping 6 0 6
Jones Act 5 1 6
Aliens and Citizenship 9 5 14
Anti-Trust 14 4 (3) C 21
Agricultural Production and Control 9 0 9
Army and Navy 10 5 15
Administrative Law 13 3 (1) 17
Bankruptcy 17 2 (1) 20
Common Law Topics 69 1 (1) 71
Tort Claims Act and Public
Contracts 15 0 (3) 18
FELA 11 3 14
Federal Safety Appliance Act 4 0 4
Criminal Law 87 12 (6) 105
Civil Rights 9 1 (1) 11
Domestic Relations 7 2 (2) 11
Eminent Domain 5 0 5
Federal Power Act 5 3 8
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics' 6 1 7
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 31 6 37
Government Personnel 7 0 (1) 8
Labor 35 12 (6) 53
Patents and Copyrights 19 3 (2) 24
Taxation 50 13 (3) 66
Cases Under Miscellaneous Statutes 24 9 (2) 35
a-Figures do not include companion cases.
b-Signed opinions only. Per Curiam Opinions are not included anywhere in
this table.
c-Figures in parenthesis, totalling 32, are those cases which in the opinion of the
authors warranted full review although they did not receive it. They include
companion cases.
